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Blessed are the forgetful; for they get the better 
even of their blunders.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: 
Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future
Not all memories are equally welcome. Contrary to the 
commonly held belief that forgetting is undesired and to 
be circumvented, there are many everyday situations in 
which we would rather not recall certain memories. For 
example, confronting a reminder of a previous relation-
ship can call to mind intrusive memories that occupy our 
consciousness, causing distress and distraction. Under-
standably, people often avoid such reminders as a way of 
managing thoughts about an unpleasant past. Reminders 
can, however, be unavoidable. People, places, or objects 
may resemble, perceptually or conceptually, features of 
unwanted memories and trigger unwelcome retrievals; 
when this happens, people often suppress the retrieval 
process to stop the unwanted memories from coming to 
mind, which may reduce their later accessibility.
Retrieval suppression has been studied extensively using 
the think/no-think (TNT) paradigm (Anderson & Green, 
2001; for a recent review, see Anderson & Hanslmayr, 
2014). In this procedure (Fig. 1a), people learn cue-target 
pairs and are then given the cues again with instructions 
either to retrieve (i.e., “think”) or to stop retrieval of (i.e., 
“no-think”) the associated target memories while also sus-
taining attention to the cue. Critically, performing the latter 
no-think task requires that people override the cue’s strong 
tendency to elicit automatic retrieval of its associated mem-
ory. Behavioral and neuroimaging evidence suggests that 
such retrieval suppression engages inhibitory control 
mechanisms that enable people to stop habitual response 
tendencies, such as reflexive motor responses or thoughts 
(see Anderson et al., 2004; Depue, Orr, Smolker, Naaz, & 
Banich, 2016). Evidence of inhibition can be detected via 
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Abstract
The ability to control unwanted memories is critical for maintaining cognitive function and mental health. Prior research 
has shown that suppressing the retrieval of unwanted memories impairs their retention, as measured using intentional 
(direct) memory tests. Here, we review emerging evidence revealing that retrieval suppression can also reduce the 
unintended influence of suppressed traces. In particular, retrieval suppression (a) gradually diminishes the tendency 
for memories to intrude into awareness and (b) reduces memories’ unintended expressions on indirect memory tests. 
We present a neural account in which, during suppression, retrieval cues elicit hippocampally triggered neocortical 
activity that briefly reinstates features of the original event, which, in turn, are suppressed by targeted neocortical and 
hippocampal inhibition. This reactivation-dependent reinstatement principle could provide a broad mechanism by 
which suppressing retrieval of intrusive memories limits their indirect influences.
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suppression’s negative aftereffects on suppressed items: On 
episodic-memory tests, suppressed items are recalled more 
poorly than are baseline items, a phenomenon known as 
suppression-induced forgetting. The amount of forgetting 
increases with the number of times a memory has been 
suppressed, indicating that unwanted memories are cumu-
latively inhibited over repeated suppressions. A number 
of variables moderate the size and indeed the occurrence 
of this effect in explicit memory (e.g., compliance, vigi-
lance; see Anderson & Huddleston, 2012, for a thorough 
review of key moderators). Retrieval-suppression research 
thus indicates that people can stop episodic retrieval and 
that this process causes forgetting on direct memory tests.
Until recently, however, it was unknown whether 
suppressing retrieval affects less conscious, uninten-
tional retrieval of unwanted memories and, if so, how 
this might be achieved. We use unintentional memory 
throughout to refer to indirect expressions of memory as 
revealed by conventional tests of implicit memory as 
well as retrieval (conscious or not) that is elicited invol-
untarily upon encountering reminders, despite a lack of 
any intention to retrieve a memory. Here, we review 
emerging evidence indicating that retrieval suppression 
can diminish these unintentional expressions of mem-
ory, and we discuss the neural mechanisms underlying 
these effects.
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Fig. 1. Procedural overview and results for a think/no-think task (TNT; a) and assessment of involuntary TNT intrusions (b). In the TNT paradigm 
(a), participants first learn cue-target pairs during the encoding session. During the TNT session, participants are repeatedly presented with the origi-
nal cue words in either green (“think”) or red (“no-think”) font colors and are asked to think or to not think about the associated target memories, 
respectively. In a subsequent cued-recall session, participants are prompted to recall each target that was paired with the original cue word. Results 
show that repeatedly suppressing the no-think items (approximately 10–16 times) reduces the likelihood these memories can be recalled (Anderson 
& Green, 2001). This basic paradigm has been extended to investigate the suppression of different types of materials, and the consequences of 
suppression have been assessed with a variety of tests. On each trial of one study assessing involuntary intrusions during TNT sessions (Levy & 
Anderson, 2012), participants were asked to report how often they thought of the associated targets upon seeing think and no-think reminders (b). 
Involuntary intrusions on no-think trials, indicated by ratings of 2 or 3, declined with repeated suppression.
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Why Study Unintentional Retrieval?
Explicit and implicit memories have often been dissoci-
ated (Schacter, 1987). Given this dissociation, retrieval 
suppression could, in principle, impair explicit retrieval 
while preserving unintended expressions of memory, 
allowing traces to exert potentially unwanted effects out-
side of awareness. A selective disruption of explicit mem-
ory would be compatible with evidence that retrieval 
suppression down-regulates activity in the hippocampus, 
a structure critical to the formation of episodic memories 
(Anderson et al., 2004; see Anderson & Hanslmayr, 2014, 
for a review), as well as event-related potential (ERP) 
activity associated with conscious recollection (Bergström, 
Velmans, De Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2007). Alter-
natively, if suppression also disrupts unintentional 
retrieval, this raises the possibility that cognitive or neu-
robiological theories of this process couched exclusively 
in terms of episodic memory do not capture key dynam-
ics of the suppression mechanism and its targets.
Whether suppression reduces unintended retrieval 
also has implications for how it might affect mental 
health. In everyday life, people rarely intentionally recall 
unwanted memories, especially after they have tried to 
suppress them. Rather, the more practical concern is the 
tendency of unwanted memories either to intrude into 
awareness involuntarily or to influence behavior indi-
rectly, in potentially unhealthy ways. Indeed, excessive 
intrusions arise in a range of psychopathologies including 
anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Brewin, 
2014), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Speckens, Hackmann, 
Ehlers, & Cuthber, 2007), and depression (Brewin, Gregory, 
Lipton, & Burgess, 2010) and often occur along with path-
ological rumination (Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 
2011). Intrusions are usually perceived as vivid, detailed, 
unexpected, uninvited, and uncontrollable. To resist intru-
sions, people may engage in self-distraction or avoidance 
of triggers, strategies that paradoxically are associated 
with increased thought frequency, hypervigilance, and 
negative appraisal of the meaning of intrusions (e.g., 
Purdon, 2004). For these reasons, some have argued that 
attempts to suppress intrusions are unhelpful and mal-
adaptive (cf. Dunn, Billotti, Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009). 
Some theoretical accounts even maintain that success-
fully forgotten memories continue to influence behavior 
and thought implicitly, undermining mental health (e.g., 
Berlin, 2011; Pennebaker & Susman, 1988; Schwartz, 
1990). Although clinical observations about unconscious 
influences are widely discussed, research has not ade-
quately separated the effects of avoidance (e.g., avoiding 
triggers) from those of retrieval suppression, which are 
theoretically distinct (Catarino, Küpper, Werner-Seidler, 
Dalgleish, & Anderson, 2015). As a result, without direct 
evidence concerning whether and how retrieval suppres-
sion influences unintended retrieval, one cannot evaluate 
its implications for mental health. Therefore, studying 
whether suppression affects unintentional retrieval may 
expand our understanding of this process and provide 
critical information about its clinical implications.
Suppression Reduces Unintentional 
Memory Intrusions
How effective is retrieval suppression at mitigating the 
occurrence of automatic, intrusive retrievals? Does the 
fact that intrusive memories come to mind despite our 
intention to stop them mean that suppression is unlikely 
to be effective at countering them in the long run? One 
difficulty in studying this issue is in measuring involun-
tary retrievals in the laboratory. To answer these ques-
tions, Levy and Anderson (2012) conducted an experiment 
with the TNT task and asked participants to report on a 
trial-by-trial basis whether unwanted memories had 
intruded into awareness on the preceding no-think trial 
(Fig. 1b). Critically, because participants were striving to 
prevent the cue from eliciting retrieval of its associated 
memory on no-think trials, any retrieval that arose would 
be not only unintentional but also counter-intentional, 
happening despite efforts to stop it. Thus, intrusions dur-
ing no-think trials provided a clear operational definition 
of involuntary memory. Levy and Anderson found that 
people did experience counter-intentional intrusions 
during retrieval suppression (for 60% of the items, on 
average, on the first suppression trial). However, partici-
pants dramatically decreased these intrusions across 
repeated suppressions (Fig. 1b; see also Benoit, Hulbert, 
Huddleston, & Anderson, 2015, and van Schie & 
Anderson, 2017). Interestingly, participants who reduced 
intrusions effectively also showed the greatest suppres-
sion-induced forgetting on the final test. This finding 
suggests that suppression reduces both unintentional 
retrievals during suppression attempts and later inten-
tional retrieval, and that these effects are related. Reduced 
intrusions have been observed with pairs of words as 
well as with visual images (Benoit et al., 2015). The 
temporal dynamics of intrusions and their purging from 
working memory have, moreover, been documented 
with ERPs and linked to suppression-induced forgetting 
(Hellerstedt, Johansson, & Anderson, 2016).
Does the ability to suppress retrieval predict how well 
people regulate intrusive emotional memories? Recently, 
Streb, Mecklinger, Anderson, Johanna, and Michael 
(2016) examined this issue using the trauma film para-
digm (Holmes & Bourne, 2008). Participants first com-
pleted the TNT task with simple word pairs, and both 
behavioral (suppression-induced forgetting) and ERP 
(the N2 component) measures of memory-control ability 
were computed. Next, participants viewed a short film 
that participants in prior studies have perceived as 
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disturbing and that elicits intrusive thoughts. One week 
later, participants completed the Impact of Event Scale 
for the traumatic film, which measures the frequency and 
impact of intrusive thoughts about the target incident. 
Streb et al. found that individuals with better retrieval-
suppression ability (whether measured behaviorally or 
electrophysiologically) reported significantly less dis-
tressing intrusions during the preceding week. Con-
versely, Catarino et al. (2015) found that participants with 
PTSD showed significantly less suppression-induced 
forgetting of unpleasant scenes and that suppression 
effects predicted participants’ symptom severity. Similar 
deficits in suppression-induced forgetting arise in people 
suffering from rumination and anxiety (e.g., Fawcett 
et al., 2015; Marzi, Regina, & Righi, 2014). Collectively, 
these findings suggest that in addition to reducing inten-
tional explicit memory, retrieval suppression reduces 
involuntary retrievals.
Suppression Reduces the Unintended 
Influence of Memory on Behavior
Even when people successfully control involuntary 
retrieval by purging unwanted memories from conscious-
ness, suppressed memories could still influence behavior 
outside of awareness. To examine this possibility, several 
lines of research have employed indirect memory tests.
Hertel, Large, Stuck, and Levy (2012) used a free-
association test to examine whether suppression arises on 
indirect tests. Participants first encoded cue-target word 
pairs and then participated in a TNT session. On a later 
free-association test, they were encouraged to report the 
first word that came to mind upon seeing a particular cue 
that they had encountered in the previous encoding ses-
sion. Hertel et al. found that words that participants had 
previously suppressed during no-think trials were signifi-
cantly less likely to be elicited in this free-association test. 
However, implicit memory tests that instead access par-
ticipants’ memory for lower-level visual word form (e.g., a 
word’s orthography) have, in one study, not shown 
evidence of suppression (Angello, Storm, & Smith, 2015).
Subsequent research has shown that implicit suppres-
sion-induced-forgetting effects are not limited to concep-
tually oriented indirect tests but also impair perceptual 
repetition priming. In the first report of this, Kim and Yi 
(2013) asked participants to suppress retrieval of line 
drawings of visual objects. Later, participants performed 
a perceptual-identification task requiring them to identify 
briefly flashed images in visual noise. On such tests, peo-
ple are usually better at identifying previously seen 
objects compared to novel items, a classic repetition-
priming effect. Strikingly, across several experiments, 
Kim and Yi found that retrieval suppression significantly 
reduced repetition priming for no-think images. These 
findings indicate that retrieval suppression had counter-
acted the perceptual advantage normally enjoyed by 
repeated visual stimuli. Informatively, these implicit-
suppression effects were abolished when test images 
were mirror-reversed upon repetition, suggesting that 
suppression directly inhibited perceptual representations 
(Kim & Yi, 2013). Consistent with this possibility, a study 
using photographs of real objects replicated reduced 
repetition priming and also observed reduced neural 
priming (i.e., repetition suppression) for the suppressed 
objects in visual object-perception regions (Gagnepain, 
Henson, & Anderson, 2014).
These demonstrations of reduced repetition priming 
have theoretical implications for the mechanisms under-
lying suppression-induced forgetting. For instance, puta-
tively inhibitory effects observed on episodic cued-recall 
tests may instead reflect non-inhibitory mechanisms such 
as associative interference (e.g., Hertel & Calcaterra, 
2005) or changes in context ( Jonker, Seli, & MacLeod, 
2015). Through these mechanisms, during the no-think 
task, the reminder cues become associated with alterna-
tive, distracting thoughts (associative interference) or 
with a new experimental context (context change); later, 
during the final cued-recall test, the reminder cues may 
now elicit either the alternative associations participants 
had formed (interference view) or the novel TNT-phase 
context associated with the reminder (context-change 
view), impairing memory for the original item, which is 
encountered only in the original study context. However, 
indirect tests such as perceptual identification do not 
require explicit recall but merely ask participants to 
perceive objects in visual noise; moreover, this task does 
not present the reminder cue from the TNT phase but 
only the visual object that is putatively inhibited, elimi-
nating key preconditions of these mechanisms. Demon-
strations of suppression-induced forgetting in this task, 
therefore, indicate that these alternative mechanisms are 
not sufficient to account for key phenomena and that 
item-specific inhibition is more likely. These findings 
echo work indicating that suppression-induced forgetting 
on episodic-memory tests is observed when suppressed 
items are tested with novel independent probes that cir-
cumvent interference (Anderson & Green, 2001; Wang, 
Cao, Zhu, Cai, & Wu, 2015; see Anderson & Hanslmayr, 
2014, for a review).
The foregoing findings indicate that retrieval suppres-
sion can reduce indirect effects of prior experience on 
cognition, at least for relatively simple materials. Recently, 
however, Hu, Bergström, Bodenhausen, and Rosenfeld 
(2015) extended this research by showing that suppres-
sion can reduce the unintentional influences of autobio-
graphical memories with rich sensorimotor details. 
Participants engaged in a mock crime that involved taking 
a ring from a professor’s mailbox. They then completed an 
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ERP memory-detection test wherein they were motivated 
to suppress retrieval of crime-relevant memories to avoid 
being detected. After the suppression phase, Hu et al. (2015) 
employed an autobiographical Implicit Association Test to 
indirectly measure the automatic activation of autobio-
graphical memories (Hu, Rosenfeld, & Bodenhausen, 2012; 
Satori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008). Hu 
et al. found that the retrieval-related ERP positivity during 
the 300- to 800-ms poststimulus window was reduced dur-
ing retrieval suppression (see also Bergström, Anderson, 
Buda, Simons, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2013) and, further-
more, that prior efforts to suppress retrieval had reduced the 
ability of the indirect test to detect automatic activation of 
crime-relevant memories in guilty participants (Fig. 2).
Targeted Neocortical Inhibition as a 
Mechanism for Disrupting Unintended 
Retrieval
Evidence suggests that the need to countermand involun-
tary retrievals during retrieval suppression triggers inhibi-
tory processes that down-regulate activity not only in the 
hippocampus but also in neocortical regions that support 
priming on indirect tests. The importance of intrusions 
was first demonstrated for the hippocampus. Using trial-
by-trial intrusion reports, Levy and Anderson (2012) 
showed that retrieval suppression down-regulated hip-
pocampal activity to a significantly greater extent during 
intrusion trials than during non-intrusions, and that only 
intrusion-related down-regulation predicted later sup-
pression-induced forgetting. A later study found that neg-
ative coupling (an index of effective connectivity 
quantifying the inhibitory influence of one brain region 
on another) between the right dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex and the hippocampus during early suppression trials 
predicted a greater decline in intrusions later in the TNT 
phase (Benoit et al., 2015), supporting the notion that 
top-down inhibitory control over memory-related regions 
(e.g., the hippocampus) gradually disrupts memories and 
renders them less likely to be involuntarily retrieved 
(Anderson, Bunce, & Barbas, 2016).
Although hippocampal modulation is a key mecha-
nism for controlling retrieval, control mechanisms also 
appear to target neocortical regions, particularly if neo-
cortical traces are reactivated during intrusions. One 
broadly held view of retrieval is that perceptual remind-
ers elicit pattern completion in the hippocampus, which, 
via reentrant connectivity with the neocortex, reinstates 
sensory neural patterns that contributed to the episodic 
experience (Danker & Anderson, 2010; McClelland, 
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995). If intrusions also trigger 
such reinstatement, inhibitory control may also target 
a b c
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Fig. 2. Results from Hu, Bergström, Bodenhausen, and Rosenfeld (2015) revealing the effects of suppressing unwanted autobiographical memo-
ries. “Guilty” participants enacted a lab crime in which they took a ring from a professor’s mailbox, whereas “innocent” participants wrote their 
initials on a board (a). Event-related potential (ERP) difference waves (ERP for crime-relevant stimulus—“ring”—minus the average ERP for crime-
irrelevant stimuli—e.g., “wallet,” “bracelet”) revealed effects of retrieval suppression on autobiographical memory (b). A classic guilty-knowledge 
effect was evident among guilty participants without suppression instructions (guilty-standard group), as shown by enhanced retrieval-related 
ERP positivity during the 300- to 800-ms poststimulus window (for a recent review, see Rosenfeld, Hu, Labkovsky, Meixner, & Winograd, 2013). 
However, retrieval suppression largely attenuated this ERP positivity while enhancing the subsequent late posterior negativity (800–1,300 ms). 
Thus, individual guilty-suppression participants could be accurately detected when both ERP components were combined in a peak-to-peak man-
ner. In an autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT), compared to guilty-standard participants, guilty-suppression participants showed a 
significantly weaker implicit expression of their autobiographical memory (c). D scores reflected the strength of automatic activation of criminal 
memories and its unintentional influence on participants’ behavior (for rationales behind the aIAT and D scores, see Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, 
Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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neocortical traces to suppress retrieval (Fig. 3). This 
hypothesized targeting of neocortical representations by 
inhibitory control raises an important possibility: If neo-
cortical traces support indirect expressions of memory 
on implicit tests, targeted neocortical inhibition may 
disrupt unintentional expressions of memory. Supporting 
this possibility, Gagnepain et al. (2014) found that when 
people suppressed episodic retrieval of visual object 
memories, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex down-
regulated activity not only in the hippocampus but also 
in visual object-perception regions in the fusiform cortex 
(see also Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007). Importantly, a 
separate perceptual-identification test for the visual 
objects conducted after the TNT phase had ended 
revealed reduced neural priming for those objects that 
participants had suppressed from awareness. Critically, 
inhibitory modulation of the fusiform cortex (as mea-
sured by effective connectivity analyses) during the TNT 
phase predicted how much neural priming was disrupted 
on the later perceptual-identification test. These findings 
indicate that inhibitory control during retrieval suppres-
sion disrupted objects’ sensory representations, reducing 
the later ability of those sensory traces to indirectly 
enhance perception (see Fig. 4), consistent with the exis-
tence of item-specific inhibition.
Critically, the need to suppress reentrant activation of 
neocortical traces in this manner provides a general theo-
retical mechanism by which retrieval suppression could 
disrupt implicit memory across many content domains 
(Gagnepain et al., 2014). For instance, if reminders acti-
vate semantic representations associated with a memory 
item, suppression may disrupt conceptual priming (e.g., 
Hertel et al., 2012) via targeted activity-dependent inhibi-
tion of neocortical regions within the medial temporal 
lobe that support that type of priming (Anderson & 
Hanslmayr, 2014; Mayes, Montaldi, & Migo, 2007). 
Similarly, if reminders reactivate a memory’s emotional 
features, suppression may disrupt emotional traces 
via activity-dependent inhibition of amygdala activity 
(e.g., Depue et al., 2007). In the case of involuntary epi-
sodic remindings (conscious intrusions), reinstatement-
dependent inhibition may jointly influence hippocampal 
and neocortical traces. Indeed, autobiographical retrieval 
engages the visual cortex and the hippocampus, possibly 
as a result of autobiographical memories’ rich sensory 
details (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007). Accordingly, 
suppressing autobiographical memories may target 
both the visual cortex and the hippocampus (see 
Noreen, O’Connor & MacLeod, 2016), reducing auto-
biographical memories’ unintentional influences. Thus, 
Fig. 3. A schematic illustrating parallel, targeted inhibition of hippocampal, amygdala, and neocortical 
traces exerted by the prefrontal cortex during retrieval suppression. During retrieval suppression, sen-
sory inputs from no-think reminders feed into the hippocampus (blue region), where they elicit pattern 
completion through reentrant connections to the amygdala (pink region), anterior and posterior parahip-
pocampal gyrus (dark and light green regions, respectively), and visual cortex (black and white voxel 
grid). Completed patterns, symbolized here by red reactivated voxels in the visual cortex, reinstate neural 
activity that contributes to episodic experience (i.e., involuntary yet conscious intrusion) and interfere 
with goal-directed suppression. Such intrusions may trigger inhibitory control mediated by the right 
middle frontal gyrus (rMFG) to target both hippocampal and reactivated sites, gradually disrupting the 
corresponding neural/memory representations and impairing both intentional retrieval and unintentional 
memory expressions. 
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parallel, activity-dependent inhibition of hippocampal 
and neocortical traces may disrupt involuntary episodic 
retrievals and also impair implicit memory (Gagnepain 
et al., 2014).
Conclusion
To free us from the influence of unwanted memories, 
retrieval suppression would ideally not only reduce their 
accessibility during intentional retrieval but also limit their 
unintended expressions. Here, we have reviewed recent 
evidence that suppression does, in fact, accomplish the lat-
ter function: It reduces memory intrusions and diminishes 
unwanted memories’ unintentional expressions in behav-
ior. Reduced unintentional memories have been docu-
mented for a variety of content, ranging from verbal and 
simple perceptual to richly sensorimotor autobiographical 
memories. Neuroimaging research has, moreover, provided 
a key candidate mechanism for this function: When 
memory intrusions reactivate neocortical representations of 
to-be-suppressed memories via hippocampal pattern com-
pletion, both hippocampal and neocortical traces become 
targets for prefrontally mediated inhibitory-control pro-
cesses. The top-down modulation of hippocampal and 
neocortical regions gradually disrupts the intruding traces, 
eventually modifying their unintended influences on later 
perception and cognition.
Many important questions await exploration. First, 
although retrieval suppression often succeeds and is ben-
eficial, under some conditions, suppression appears to be 
counterproductive. For example, some people may fail to 
suppress retrieval effectively and suffer increased acces-
sibility of unwanted traces as a result (Catarino et al., 
2015), a problem of particular concern in psychiatric 
Fig. 4. Results from Gagnepain, Henson, and Anderson (2014) showing that suppressing perceptual memories reduced subsequent perceptual 
priming on both behavioral and neural measures. Suppression recruited the right middle frontal gyrus (a) to down-regulate the left fusiform gyrus 
(b), as established via effective connectivity analyses. On a perceptual-identification test conducted after the think/no-think phase, reaction times 
revealed impaired behavioral priming effects for no-think trials compared to think and baseline trials (c). Results from fMRI scans during the final 
perceptual-identification task revealed impaired neural repetition-priming effects for no-think items (d; left), particularly when the right middle 
frontal gyrus had effectively down-regulated the left fusiform gyrus during the earlier think/no-think phase (d; right). Reprinted from “Neural Mech-
anisms of Motivated Forgetting,” by M. C. Anderson and S. Hanslmayr, 2014, Trends in Cognitive Science, 18, p. 288. Copyright 2014 by Elsevier. 
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conditions characterized by deficits in inhibitory control. 
Moreover, even for healthy individuals, being asked to 
suppress a thought can increase its accessibility if the to-
be-suppressed thought is part of the task instructions that 
need to be intermittently maintained in working memory, 
as in Wegner’s thought-suppression procedure (“Don’t 
think of a white bear”: Wegner, 1994; see Anderson & 
Huddleston, 2012, for a discussion). Clearly isolating how 
retrieval suppression differs from thought suppression 
and the conditions under which suppression succeeds or 
fails is a key priority. Second, although retrieval suppres-
sion reduces unintentional retrieval, results from related 
procedures, such as the list-method directed-forgetting 
paradigm, show that attempts to forget can impair inten-
tional recall while leaving implicit memory intact (Bjork & 
Bjork, 2003). This difference suggests that some moti-
vated-forgetting manipulations disrupt memory for indi-
vidual items (retrieval suppression), whereas others 
instead may disrupt episodic context memory common to 
a set of items (directed forgetting; see Anderson, 2005, for 
a discussion), which may have important clinical implica-
tions. Third, a full understanding of how suppression 
affects memory requires an examination of its effects on 
reminders themselves. Interestingly, Hertel and Hayes 
(2015) recently showed that reminders for suppressed 
items captured more attention in a subsequent flanker 
task, likely because of repeated attention to these remind-
ers during the TNT task.
More generally, however, the findings reviewed here 
suggest that it is useful for researchers and clinicians to 
reconsider the belief that suppression leaves unconscious 
expressions of memory intact. This pervasive belief 
might, in fact, arise precisely because psychopathological 
symptoms of interest to clinicians emerge in people who 
may have had preexisting deficits in memory-control 
capacity (Cole, Repovš, & Anticevic, 2014). In such indi-
viduals, suppression may indeed leave unintended 
expressions of memory intact, a possibility that can be 
tested experimentally. Ultimately, research on retrieval 
suppression holds the potential to develop a well-specified 
neurocognitive model concerning how people voluntarily 
control mnemonic awareness. Such a model could inform 
the development of interventions that would increase the 
integrity of the memory-control network, reduce intrusive 
thoughts, and improve mental health.
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